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Objective. To assess relationships between changes in Medicare Advantage (MA)
payment rates and Medicare beneficiary hospitalizations and to simulate the effects
of scheduled payment cuts on ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) and elective hospital-
ization rates.
Data. State Inpatient Database discharge abstracts from Arizona, Florida, and New
York merged with administrative Medicare enrollment and MA payment data.
Study Design. Retrospective, fixed effect regression analysis of the relationship be-
tween MA payment rates and rates of ACS and elective hospitalizations among Med-
icare beneficiaries in counties with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and 3 percent
MA penetration from 1999 to 2005.
Principal Findings. MA payment rates were negatively related to rates of ACS
admissions. Simulations suggest that payment cuts could be associated with higher rates
of ACS admissions. No relationship between MA payments and rates of elective hos-
pitalizations was found.
Conclusions. Reductions in MA payment rates may result in a small increase in ACS
admissions. Trends in ACS admissions among chronically ill Medicare beneficiaries
should be tracked following MA payment cuts.
Key Words. Medicare Advantage, payments, hospitalization rates, managed
care, quality
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA) is projected
to achieve U.S.$145 billion in savings through reduced payments to Medicare
Advantage (MA) plans over the coming decade (Foster 2010). MA is a
voluntary managed care alternative to Fee-for-Service (FFS) Medicare that
provides additional benefits beyond the basic Medicare benefit package
to enrollees who join managed care networks. Though managed care plans




were initially introduced as a cost-saving mechanism, the Medicare Payment
Advisory Commission estimates that payments to MA plans total 114 percent
of FFS spending for otherwise similar beneficiaries (MedPAC 2009).
However, MA plans are required to use payments exceeding expected
costs on additional benefits or reduced cost sharing for enrollees. These ben-
efits may have positive health effects, for example, by improving access to care
for lower-income seniors who disproportionately enroll (Atherly and Thorpe
2005). The planned cuts in MA payments have raised concerns about the
health implications of benefit reductions for the 23 percent of Medicare
beneficiaries currently enrolled in an MA plan (Herszenhorn 2009).
Limited empirical evidence about the relationship between payments to
MA plans and the care provided to Medicare beneficiaries has led to spec-
ulation about the value of additional payments to MA plans. President Obama
articulates one view, that the additional payments to MA plans are ‘‘unwar-
ranted subsidies in Medicare that go to insurance companies——subsidies that
do everything to pad their profits but don’t improve the care of seniors’’ (Wall
Street Journal 2009). Health insurers argue that payment cuts would reduce
benefits and increase costs to patients, which could affect utilization and health
outcomes. As payment rates become more generous, plans can invest in
additional benefits such as disease management or reduced cost sharing for
preventive service use; strategies which may reduce hospitalization use. Pay-
ment reductions introduced by the 1997 Balanced Budget Act (BBA) were
associated with plan withdrawals from many markets and declines in supple-
mental benefits (Gold et al. 2004; Berenson and Dowd 2009).
Changes in MA payment rates may also affect the quality of care provided
to FFS participants. Higher plan payments have been shown to increase managed
care enrollment (Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin 2005). Earlier studies have
also found significant spillover effects from Medicare managed care influencing
treatment patterns of all Medicare beneficiaries (Baker 1997; Gaskin and Hadley
1997; Bundorf et al. 2004; Chernew, DiCicca, and Town 2008). Chernew,
DiCicca, and Town (2008) find that higher MA penetration reduces FFS spend-
ing and suggest that optimal MMC payment strategy should account for spill-
overs to FFS with higher payments to MA plans to further encourage enrollment
rather than payment cuts. Because spillover effects are more likely under higher
levels of managed care penetration, changes in MA payment rates can affect
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quality of care for all Medicare beneficiaries by altering the nature and magnitude
of spillovers as well by changing the composition of program participants.
Improved understanding of the potential consequences of changing MA
payment policy is necessary to evaluate the impact of health reform proposals
on seniors. If there are adverse health and utilization consequences of pay-
ment reductions, policy makers may overstate the potential savings. I used the
variation in payments across counties and over time established by federal
plan payment policy resulting from a series of Congressional policy changes to
study the relationship between payments to MA plans and hospitalization
rates among Medicare beneficiaries from 1999 to 2005. I examined rates of
acute and chronic ambulatory care sensitive (ACS) admissions, which may be
influenced by the additional benefits provided by MA plans, and elective
hospitalizations, which may become more tightly rationed in response to
lower payments. Results from this analysis were used to simulate changes in
hospitalization rates that might occur in response to the PPACA payment cuts.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
Changes in MA payment rates may affect the type of care provided to Medicare
beneficiaries through several channels. Managed care plans may alter benefit
packages offered to MA enrollees. In response to the change in benefit avail-
ability, MA plans become more or less attractive to enrollees, changing the
composition of MA and FFS enrollee groups. Finally, changes in MA market
share alter managed care plans’ influence over provider practice patterns.
Benefit Packages
Payment rates may directly affect the types and amount of care provided to
MA enrollees. Plans are required to use additional payments to provide
enrollees with supplemental benefits, which can include prescription drug
coverage, reduced cost sharing, and gym memberships. Thus, payment
decreases may increase rates of ACS admissions by reducing access to phar-
maceuticals and outpatient services that help to prevent these types of admis-
sions. Alternatively, plans may try to pass payment cuts on to providers, change
or restrict service networks, all of which can create access barriers for patients
requiring time-sensitive care or expensive, elective procedures. Other benefi-
ciaries will lose access to supplemental benefits through plan withdrawals;
Medicare managed care penetration declined between 1998 and 2001 as plans
left the market in response to BBA-induced lower payment rates (Gold 2003).
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MA Enrollment
Reduction in plan payment may lead beneficiaries to move from MA to FFS as
less generous benefit packages are provided in exchange for managed care
network restrictions. Several studies have shown that both plans and Medicare
beneficiaries are more willing to participate in counties with higher per-
enrollee payment rates (Cawley, Chernew, and McLaughlin 2002, 2005;
Chernew, DiCicca, and Town 2008). The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services Office of the Actuary estimate that MA enrollment will fall by 7.4
million by 2019 in response to PPACA provisions (Foster 2010). Rate change
induced MA disenrollment may increase rates of ACS admissions as fewer
Medicare beneficiaries have access to supplemental benefits.
Spillover Effects
Reductions in MA payment rates will affect care provided to FFS enrollees
because managed care spillover effects will decline in markets with shrinking
MA penetration. Spillovers can occur, for example, if providers adapt a single
practice style with which to treat all patients that is influenced by managed
care requirements. A large literature examining managed care in both Med-
icare and private health insurance finds that managed care and nonmanaged
care markets are linked. Spillovers from managed care have been shown to
affect total FFS spending (Baker 1997; Chernew, DiCicca, and Town 2008),
provider practice patterns (Glied and Zivin 2002; Heidenreich et al. 2002;
Bundorf et al. 2004; Zhan et al. 2004), and market-level health technology
(Baker 2001; Baker et al. 2004). Reduced MA spillovers may increase ACS
admissions as managed care penetration has been linked to greater preven-
tative service use (Miller and Luft 2002; Zhan et al. 2004). Declines in the
spillover influence of managed care practices may also increase rates of elec-
tive surgery if managed care plans promote more stringent assessment of need.
STUDY DATA AND METHODS
Data Sources
I used 7 years of county-level MA payment data and Medicare enrollment
data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services and hospital dis-
charge data from the Health Care Cost and Utilization Project State Inpatient
Databases (SID) for Arizona, Florida, and New York from 1999 to 2005.
Nearly one-quarter of MA enrollees live in these three states during the study
period. Analyses were conducted at the county level, pooling FFS and MA
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enrollees in order to estimate the total effect of changes in MA payment,
including direct effects of spending on MA enrollees, compositional changes
in MA enrollment, and spillover effects to FFS. Because changes in payment
rates influence movement in and out of MA plans, regressions of MA-specific
hospitalization rates on payments may be biased by selection effects related to
both Medicare coverage type and risk of hospitalization.
SID. The SID contain discharge abstracts for the universe of in-state
hospitalizations in the three states. International Classification of Disease,
Ninth Revision (ICD-9) codes were used to identify acute and chronic ACS
and elective hospitalizations using algorithms developed by the Agency for
Health Care Research and Quality (AHRQ 2003). These types of admissions
have been previously validated as quality indicators and are used by
MedPAC to assess quality of care in FFS Medicare (UCSF-Stanford 2001;
AHRQ 2003).
I calculated rates of hospitalization per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries in
each county-year for the three types of hospitalizations. In order to calculate
reliable rates of hospitalization, I limited the sample to the 398 county-year
observations with at least 10,000 elderly Medicare beneficiaries and at least
3 percent MA market share. ACS and elective hospitalizations were fairly
common among Medicare beneficiaries (Table 1). Rates of potentially
preventable ACS hospitalizations modestly decreased during the study
period, from 53.2 per 1,000 beneficiaries in 1999 to 45.2 in 2005, indicating
quality improvements overall. Rates of elective procedure use increased
between 1999 and 2002 and decreased in subsequent years, averaging 19.0
per 1,000 beneficiaries in both 1999 and 2005.
Acute ACS admissions rates are driven by admissions that could be
avoided through timely antibiotic and vaccination use in the outpatient
setting. Chronic ACS admissions reflect complications with beneficiary
chronic condition management. Among Medicare beneficiaries in the
sample, these are primarily congestive heart failure (CHF) (17.3 per 1,000
beneficiaries) and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (7.5 per 1,000)
(Table 1). While completely eliminating these types of admissions among the
Medicare population is unlikely, higher risk-adjusted rates typically indicate
lower quality of outpatient care or barriers to access. Admissions can arise
from inadequate access to prescription drugs or outpatient care. Elective
admissions are technologically intensive procedures to replace a
nonfractured hip or knee (7.6 per 1,000) or heart surgery for patients not
admitted with heart attacks (7.3 per 1,000).
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Table 1: Rates of Ambulatory Care Sensitive and Elective Hospitalization
and Average Beneficiary Characteristics Medicare Beneficiaries in Three
States, 1999–2005
Rates of Hospitalization
per 1,000 County Characteristics
All ACS conditions 54.0 Medicare advantage payment 744.8
(10.9) rate (U.S.$2005/month) (127.4)
Acute ACS conditions 20.8 MA penetration 0.19
(4.0) (0.12)
Dehydration 4.0 Low MA penetration (o16%) 0.3
(1.1) (0.4)
Pneumonia 11.9 Logged payment  Low penetration 1.7
(2.3) interaction term (2.9)
Urinary tract infection 4.9
(1.4) Black 0.09
Chronic ACS conditions 33.2 (0.08)
(7.8) Hispanic 0.04
Angina 1.2 (0.06)
(0.7) Other race 0.03
Asthma 1.9 (0.03)
(1.1) Female 0.58
Chronic obs pulmonary disease 7.5 (0.02)
(2.2) Medicaid-eligible 0.13
Congestive heart failure 17.3 (0.09)
(3.8) End-stage renal disease 0.01
Diabetes: amputation 0.9 (0.00)
(0.3) Age 75–85 0.35
Diabetes: L–T complications 2.9 (0.03)
(1.2) Age 851 0.14






Angioplasty (nonheart attack) 3.2
(1.2)
Coronary artery bypass graft 7.3
(2.9)




Notes. Standard deviations in parentheses. 398 county-year observations from 74 counties in
Arizona, Florida, and New York, 1999–2005, with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and
3% MA penetration. Authors’ calculations based on State Inpatient Databases and Medicare
denominator file.
ACS, ambulatory care sensitive.
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Medicare Administrative Data
MA Payments. Before the introduction of the 1997 BBA, Medicare
managed care plans were paid 95 percent of the average county-level Med-
icare spending per beneficiary. The BBA divorced plan payment rates from
average county costs as a way to reduce geographic variation in payments and
estimated overpayments to plans (Berenson, 2004). As a result of these policy
changes, MA plans were paid a legislatively determined payment rate set
annually at the county level during the study period. Plans were paid the
highest of a minimum 2 percentage point increase over the prior year (in
nominal dollars), a guaranteed floor payment (with a separate rate for urban
and rural counties), and blend rate based on local and national factors. The
Medicare Modernization Act increased payment rates in 2004 and intro-
duced an additional rate category equal to 100 percent of expected FFS
spending (MedPac 2004).
I used the unadjusted payment rate (in 2005 dollars), which corresponds
to a beneficiary of average risk. While actual payments to plans were adjusted
to account for beneficiary demographics, use of the unadjusted rate
provides a constant measure of payment generosity across counties that is
unaffected by differences in health status across Medicare beneficiaries in
different counties.
Beneficiary Characteristics. Medicare administrative data from the 100
percent Beneficiary Annual Summary File including average demographic
characteristics related to health care utilization (age, race, sex, state Medicaid
buy-in, and End-Stage Renal Disease status) for aged beneficiaries age
65 and older enrolled in both managed care and FFS were used for risk
adjustment. Individual characteristics were aggregated annually at the county
level (Table 1). Beneficiaries in study counties were predominantly white;
9 percent were black and 4 percent were Hispanic. Thirteen percent were
Medicaid dual-eligibles.
ANALYTIC METHODS
Annual rates of each type of hospitalization per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries
were constructed using Medicare enrollment data and SID hospitalization
counts for each county-year cell. I estimated fixed effect regressions of rates of
hospitalization on the natural logarithm of MA payment rates and beneficiary
characteristics. In order to understand the direct effects of the payment change
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on MA enrollees, I compared markets with low MA penetration, where
spillover effects were unlikely, to high-penetration markets. Markets with MA
penetration below the median rate of 16 percent were classified as low.1 The
equation of interest is
H ct ¼ a lnðMActÞ þ tlow penct þ jlowct  lnðMAÞ
þ bX ct þ dYearþ gCountyþ ect
: ð1Þ
County fixed effects controlled for unobservable, time-invariant county
characteristics that may influence rates of hospitalization and a series of year
indicator variables controlled for time effects across counties. In sensitivity
analysis, I included county-specific time trends to control for time-variant
market characteristics that may also affect rates of hospitalization among
Medicare beneficiaries. Observations were weighted by the number of
Medicare beneficiaries residing in the county.
Regression coefficients represent the change in hospitalization rates as-
sociated with a percentage change in payment rates. During the study period,
payment changes were governed by policy change, as will occur under
PPACA. To estimate the effect of proposed policy changes on Medicare
hospitalizations, I simulated upcoming payment changes by evaluating the
payment rate coefficients at reductions of 1, 5, and 10 percent. For an x percent
cut in payment rates, the change in hospitalization rates holding other factors
constant is ln(1 x)(a) in high-penetration counties and ln(1 x)(a1j) in low-
penetration counties. A 5 percent reduction would be more comparable to a
gradual change, while a 10 percent reduction would eliminate a substantial
portion of the average difference between MA and FFS payments.
In practice, the PPACA-prescribed reductions will lead to different-sized
cuts in different counties; 2- to 6-year transition begins with a rate freeze for all
counties for 2011. Historically, payment changes have also been nonuniform
across counties.
I conducted a placebo test to provide additional evidence that the es-
timated relationship between changes in MA payments and changes in rates of
hospitalization reflects differences in MA enrollment and benefits by regress-
ing hospitalization rates on MA payment rates and control variables in coun-
ties with o3 percent MA penetration. In markets without an MA presence,
there should be no relationship between MA payment rates and patient out-
comes because there are few enrollees to be directly affected and no spillover
effects.
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RESULTS
The implementation of the BBA payment rates led to considerable variation in
plan payments within and across counties during the study period (Figure 1
and Table 2). Payment changes in nominal terms ranged from cuts of 3 per-
cent to increases of 41 percent (95 percent CI:  3, 15 percent) in study
counties. Payments to plans remained fairly stable on average from 1999 to
2001, though there was considerable within-county change during this period.
Counties receiving only the minimum 2 percent (nominal) update rate each
year saw payments decline by 1.8 percent in real terms (95 percent CI:  2.1,
 1.6 percent) or U.S.$51 per enrollee per month over the 3-year period.
Floor counties saw major increases in payments; a U.S.$57 per month (11
percent; 95 percent CI:  1.4, 24 percent) gain in floor counties between 2000
and 2001 alone. Average MA payments increased sharply in 2004 and 2005
following payment increases legislated in the Medicare Modernization Act;
payment increases in 2004 averaged 10 percent (95 percent CI: 2, 24 percent).
This variation in payments within counties over time identifies the effect
of payment changes on Medicare patient outcomes. While regulations pre-
scribed the annual payment changes for MA plans, spending in FFS Medicare
Figure 1: Average Monthly Medicare Advantage Payment Rates (U.S.$2005)
in Study Counties, 1999–2005
Source: Author’s calculations based on Medicare Advantage Ratebooks, 1999–2005. 398 county
years from 74 counties in Arizona, Florida, and New York with at least 10,000 Medicare
beneficiaries and 3 percent Medicare Advantage penetration. All payment rates inflation-adjusted
and reported in 2005 dollars.
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steadily increased at a moderate pace; average FFS spending per capita in the
study counties increased between 2 and 5 percent annually.
MA Payments and Medicare Hospitalizations
The multivariate models examined variation in hospitalization rates and MA
payments within counties over time. Controlling for beneficiary and county
characteristics, I found a negative and statistically significant relationship be-
tween MA payment rates and both acute and chronic ACS admissions, but no
relationship between payments and elective admissions (Table 3a and b). In
high-penetration counties, a 1 percent increase in MA payment rates was
associated with 0.057 fewer acute ACS hospitalizations per 1,000 beneficiaries
and 0.12 fewer chronic ACS admissions per 1,000 (po.05). The association
between logged payment rates and elective surgery was small and statistically
insignificant (a5  2.67, SE 5 4.3)
Rates of acute and chronic ACS admissions were also positively related
to the proportion of female Medicare beneficiaries and dual-eligible Medicaid
enrollees, who often have complex health conditions. Rates of elective hos-
pitalization increased with increases in the proportion of beneficiaries with
end-stage renal disease and aged 75–85. Consistent with the disparities
literature, increases in the share of beneficiaries that are black and Hispanic
were related to lower rates of elective procedures.
Table 2: Average Annual Change in Monthly Medicare Advantage Payment
Rates (U.S.$2005) by County Payment Rate Category and Proportion of
Counties Receiving Each Rate Type
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Blend 7.67 19.3
(9.5%) (1.9%)
Floor 57.39  0.46 26.35
(71.2%) (39.3%) (44.4%)
Minimum update  17.2  12.04  21.61  11.03 16.6 14.3
(90.5) (28.8%) (60.7%) (100%) (13.0%) (61.3%)
100% FFS 86.9 23.2
(40.7%) (38.7%)
Notes. Average increase in monthly per-enrollee payment rates. Proportion of study counties
receiving each rate category in parentheses. 398 county-year observations from 74 counties in
Arizona, Florida, and New York, 1999–2005 with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and 3%
MA penetration.
FFS, Fee-for-Service.
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Because no spillovers to FFS are expected in the low-penetration market,
the combined a ln(MAct)1j lowct  ln(MA) term reflects the effect of MA
payments on only MA enrollees in low-penetration counties. The total effect
of the payment rate changes (a ln(MAct)1j lowct  ln(MA)) was only
statistically significant at 10 percent for chronic ACS admissions (F 5 2.84)
and insignificant for acute ACS admissions, suggesting that payment changes
Table 3a: Medicare Advantage Payments and Rates of Ambulatory Care
Sensitive and Elective Hospitalizations among Medicare Beneficiaries,
1999–2005
Acute ACS Chronic ACS Elective
ln(MA payment rate)  5.64nn  11.82nnn  2.67
(2.7) (3.8) (4.3)
Low MA penetration (o16%)  17.0  33.31n 11.0
(12.5) (18.0) (15.5)
Low penetration 
ln (MA payment rate)
2.6 5.07n  1.6
(1.9) (2.7) (2.4)
Black  19.2  9.0  77.98nn
(29.1) (37.1) (36.6)
Hispanic  59.8  2.9  147.96n
(39.0) (50.6) (82.9)
Other race  53.47nnn 10.6  5.1
(17.8) (30.9) (29.8)
Female 233.20nnn 167.85n  65.2
(76.5) (86.4) (65.5)
Medicaid 58.63nn 67.97nnn 60.2
(23.0) (25.2) (43.4)
End-stage renal disease 224.5  58.8 856.44nn
(258.2) (259.5) (357.9)
Age 75–85 34.6 77.47nn 99.19nn
(25.5) (33.2) (43.9)
Age 851  6.8 23.0  9.3
(57.2) (83.8) (56.1)
Observations 398 398 398
F-Statistic 13.10 25.69 32.60
Notes. Robust standard errors (95% confidence intervals) in parentheses.
nStatistically significant at 10%.
nn5%.
nnn1%. 398 county-year observations from 74 counties in Arizona, Florida, and New York, 1999–
2005 with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and 3% MA penetration. Medicare Advantage
payments expressed as the natural logarithm of the monthly per-enrollee MA county payment rate
(U.S.$2005). Low penetration variable indicates counties with MA enrollment below 16%. Models
control for county and year fixed effects.
ACS, ambulatory care sensitive.
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predominantly affected Medicare beneficiaries in markets where managed
care plans had sufficient market share to influence provider behavior.
There is little evidence that changes in MA payments affected use of
elective surgery in either high-penetration or low-penetration markets; co-
efficients are negative but imprecisely estimated.
In order to gain insight about the mechanisms through which changes in
plan payment affected quality of and access to care, equation (1) is separately
estimated for each of the types of hospitalizations listed in Table 1. Results
(presented in Appendix SA1) indicate a negative relationship between MA
payment rates and hospitalizations for CHF, hypertension, uncontrolled
diabetes, and urinary tract infections. This relationship could occur through
the prescription drug benefits available in many MA plans during the study
period, through a managed care emphasis on preventative care facilitating
earlier treatment, or improved access to outpatient care through lower
Table 3b: Estimated Changes in Rates of Medicare Ambulatory Care
Sensitive and Elective Hospitalizations Associated with Potential Medicare
Advantage Payment Cuts
Rate Reduction Acute ACS Chronic ACS Elective
High MA penetration counties
1% 0.06nn 0.12nnn 0.03
(0.002, 0.11) (0.04, 0.19) ( 0.06, 0.11)
5% 0.29nn 0.61nnn 0.14
(0.01, 0.57) (0.22, 0.99) ( 0.30, 0.58)
10% 0.59nn 1.2nnn 0.28
(0.02, 1.17) (0.46, 2.03) ( 0.62, 1.19)
Low MA penetration counties
1% 0.03 0.07n 0.04
( 0.03, 0.09) ( 0.01, 0.15) ( 0.04, 0.13)
5% 0.16 0.35n 0.22
( 0.15, 0.46) ( 0.06, 0.76) ( 0.21, 0.66)
10% 0.32 0.71n 0.45
( 0.30, 0.9) ( 0.13, 1.55) ( 0.44, 1.35)
Notes. Robust standard errors (95% confidence intervals) in parentheses.
nStatistically significant at 10%.
nn5%.
nnn1%. 398 county-year observations from 74 counties in Arizona, Florida, and New York, 1999–
2005 with at least 10,000 Medicare beneficiaries and 3% MA penetration. Medicare Advantage
payments expressed as the natural logarithm of the monthly per-enrollee MA county payment rate
(U.S.$2005). Low penetration variable indicates counties with MA enrollment below 16%. Models
control for county and year fixed effects.
ACS, ambulatory care sensitive.
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cost-sharing in the outpatient setting. Again I found that changes in MA pay-
ment rates have less of an impact on beneficiaries in low-penetration counties;
interaction terms j are positive and statistically significant for rates of dehy-
dration, urinary tract infections, CHF, and uncontrolled diabetes, reducing or
negating the overall relationship between payments and hospitalization rates
in these counties.
The second panel of Table 3a and b presents estimated effects of the
changes in rates of hospitalization per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries that would
occur if rates to MA plans are reduced by 1, 5, or 10 percent. Reductions in
MA payment rates are predicted to be accompanied by a small increase in
rates of potentially preventable hospitalizations among Medicare beneficiaries
in high managed care penetration counties. A 5 percent decrease in payments
is associated with a predicted increase in acute ACS admissions of 0.29 per
1,000 beneficiaries, a 1.4 percent increase over the 2005 rate. Chronic ACS
admissions are predicted to increase by nearly 2 percent, or 0.61 new admis-
sions per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries.
A larger, immediate payment cut of 10 percent is associated with pre-
dicted increases in rates of acute and chronic ACS admissions of 0.59 and 1.2
per 1,000, respectively. Changes in MA payments recommended in current
Congressional proposals would be phased in gradually over 10-year periods.
Thus, the 5 percent cuts are likely to more accurately capture the effects of a
payment reduction than the full 10 percent estimate. Over a 10-year period,
plans would have time to adjust benefit design to minimize the effect of
payment changes.
While simultaneous changes in enrollment and benefit availability limit
my ability to disentangle the mechanisms underlying the increase in hospi-
talizations expected in response to payment cuts, regressing hospitalization
rates on logged MA payments separately for MA and FFS enrollees suggested
that the response occurred primarily among MA enrollees. Appendix SA2
presents these results, which are based on data from the 266 county-years with
at least 10,000 beneficiaries in both MA and FFS. A 5 percent decrease in MA
payments was associated with an increase of 1.4 ACS admissions per 1,000
that is statistically significant at 10 percent. In contrast, the association between
FFS admission rates and MA payments is smaller (0.41 per 1,000) and
statistically insignificant.
Although these coefficients are likely biased by nonrandom selection in
and out of managed care, the bias is in the opposite direction of these results.
As benefit packages become less generous, sicker MA enrollees are expected
to disenroll, which would reduce rates of hospitalization for the average
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remaining MA enrollee. In contrast, the relationship between payments and
hospitalization rates was negative for MA enrollees, indicating that the benefit
package effects dominated the selection effect.
Robustness
To provide additional evidence that changes in MA payment rates are linked
to changes in rates of hospitalization, I performed a placebo test regressing
hospitalization rates on logged MA payment rates in the 453 observations
from 79 counties with managed care penetration below 3 percent. As
Appendix SA3 shows, there was no relationship between payment rates
and either ACS or elective hospitalization rates; coefficients are smaller in
magnitude than those for the MA counties and statistically insignificant.
Results were also robust to the inclusion of county-specific time trends,
which control for unobserved market factors that could explain changes in
hospitalization rates and in models that exclude observations from 2004. I
continued to find a reduction in acute and chronic ACS admissions and no
change in elective hospitalizations with changes in MA payments measured in
levels rather than logs.
DISCUSSION
Evaluating a series of legislatively determined payment rate changes
to MA plans, I found a negative relationship between MA payment rates
and rates of ACS hospitalization rates among Medicare beneficiaries. Simu-
lations based on these results suggest that reductions in MA payment rates
may result in a small increase in ACS admission rates. Although there is
considerable policy debate surrounding additional payments to MA plans
relative to FFS spending, this study is the first to provide estimates of the
potential effects of payment cuts on care provided to Medicare beneficiaries.
Largely due to limited data availability, relatively little empirical work has
been done in this area.
I did not find evidence that rates of elective procedures were related to
MA payment rates, though restricting access to expensive procedures would
be one way for plans to limit the cost of care. This finding is consistent with
earlier work indicating that managed care plans achieve cost savings by paying
lower prices rather than reducing services (Cutler, McClellan, and Newhouse
2000). Rates of elective procedures will also remain stable if sicker patients
remain in or disenroll to FFS Medicare to avoid HMO restrictions.
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I focused on the effect of payment rates on hospitalizations for all
beneficiaries rather than just MA enrollees because changes in payment rates
will change the composition of the MA enrollee population as well as the
benefits they receive. Spending on hospitalizations in FFS will be influenced by
the resulting change in beneficiary demographics as well as any changes from
practice patterns. This analysis is particularly relevant to the PPACA provisions,
which are projected to achieve savings by reducing the number of beneficiaries
enrolled in MA plans as well as the per-enrollee payments for those who
remain. A drawback to this approach is that I cannot separately account
for changes in hospitalizations driven by selective enrollment in response to
payment cuts and those related to reductions in benefits for MA enrollees.
Comparisons of high- and low MA penetration counties offered a
potential way to isolate the effect of MA payment changes on MA enrollees,
though I generally failed to find a significant effect of payment changes on
hospitalization rates in these counties. The limited influence of MA on practice
patterns in low-penetration counties is consistent with the spillover and market
share literature. Additionally, county-level hospitalization rates are weighted
averages of the MA and FFS rates, so the modest changes in outcomes for the
MA patients are likely dwarfed by the lack of change in FFS hospitalizations;
for example, a 25 percent reduction in the rate of hospitalizations among MA
enrollees would not significantly change the average rate of ACS admissions in
the average low-penetration county. Separate regressions for MA and FFS
enrollees provide descriptive evidence suggesting that the additional hospi-
talizations occur among MA enrollees. This likely reflects plans providing less
generous coverage when payment rates are lower (Gold et al. 2004).
Study findings should not be interpreted causally if other unmeasured
factors drive both payment rates and hospitalization rates. Several analytic
steps were taken to avoid this potential endogeneity. Legislatively determined
MA payment rates create a quasiexperimental setting in which to consider the
relationship between payments and quality. Use of county fixed effects con-
trolled for persistent county-level differences in payment rates, beneficiary
acuity, and propensity to use hospital care. Finally, I used standardized pay-
ment rates for an average enrollee rather than payments determined by the
county’s enrollee characteristics.
Like many other studies, interpretation of this research is limited by a
lack of data on utilization by MA enrollees. Consequently, I focused on three
states with superior data availability. While large numbers of Medicare ben-
eficiaries, including many MA enrollees, reside in these states, results may not
generalize to all states, particularly more rural areas.
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Because my data ended before the introduction of Part D, MA enroll-
ment was the only way for many seniors to access prescription drug coverage
during the study period. Consequently, findings may overstate the relation-
ship between payment rates and ACS hospitalizations if plans now use ad-
ditional payments to provide benefits that are less effective than drug coverage
at preventing hospitalizations. While MA enrollment was dominated by
HMOs during the study period, the program currently includes many Private
FFS and Preferred Provider Organizations. These types of plans typically do
less care managing, which would reduce the potential for spillover effects to
FFS, again suggesting that results in this paper represent an upper bound
estimate of the relationship between MA payment changes and rates of ACS
admissions. During the study period, large increases in payment rates were
more common than large decreases. The simulation results assume that the
response to a payment cut and payment increase are similar in magnitude but
move in opposite directions.
It is important to note that quality and access are multidimensional
constructs, and the rates of hospitalization included in this study only touch
on some measures. This is unavoidable given current data availability.
As PPACA changes are implemented, additional research will be needed to
assess the implications of payment cuts for Medicare quality and access.
Improved access to MA encounter data can aid these evaluations.
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH REFORM
Recent experience with changes in MA payment rates indicate that imple-
mentation of the PPACA provisions to reduce MA payment rates will be
associated with an increase in rates of ACS hospitalizations. It is unknown
whether other health reform provisions such as the closing of the donut hole
and additional free preventive exams will be sufficient to counteract these
effects. One way to mitigate adverse effects of spending cuts is through policy
efforts to facilitate access to vaccinations and antibiotics that can help prevent
acute ACS hospitalizations. However, ACS admissions among MA enrollees
related to chronic condition management account for the majority of new
hospitalizations projected, highlighting a potential need for alternative care
management strategies for Medicare beneficiaries with chronic illnesses.
While the expected increases in acute and chronic ACS admissions
associated with a 5 percent rate cut are relatively small in magnitude as pro-
portions of the rate per 1,000 Medicare beneficiaries, the total number of new
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hospitalizations will be economically significant when aggregated over 39
million elderly Medicare beneficiaries. Trends in hospitalizations and other
quality measures should be monitored as MA payment rates and county
benchmarks are reduced to ensure that unintended costs of the policy change
do not further strain Medicare sustainability or beneficiary health.
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1. A trichotomous specification (such as that used by Bundorf et al. 2004) was
not possible in this sample because there is insufficient variation among
counties with very low penetration (under 10 percent) to identify the
coefficient in a fixed effect model.
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
article:
Appendix SA1: Medicare Advantage Payment Changes and Rates of
Hospitalization among Medicare Beneficiaries in Three States, 1999–2005.
Appendix SA2: Medicare Advantage Payments and Rates of Hospital-
ization among Medicare Beneficiaries by Coverage Type, 1999–2005.
Appendix SA3: Placebo Test: The Effect of Medicare Advantage Pay-
ment Rates on Hospitalization Rates in Low Penetration Markets.
Please note: Wiley-Blackwell is not responsible for the content or func-
tionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries
(other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author
for the article.
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